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Abstract 
How to accommodate the possibility of lucky true beliefs in necessary (or armchair) truths 
within contemporary modal epistemology? According to safety accounts luck consists in the 
modal proximity of a false belief, but a belief in a true mathematical proposition could not 
easily be false because a proposition believed could never be false. According to Miščević 
modal stability of a true belief under small changes in the world is not enough, stability under 
small changes in the cognizer should also (and primarily) be considered. I argue for a more 
traditional modal reliabilism based on the critical question: how easy is it for a belief to be 
false, given the way it was formed?  A belief (a priori or a posteriori) is then agent-lucky 
when based on a specific method which might easily lead to a false belief in the target 
proposition. Miščević suggests a unifying approach in terms of virtue epistemology. It seems 
to me that this approach, if successful, will undermine the project that he started with: 
formulate an anti-luck condition in the frame of a modal theory of luck. 
Keywords: modal epistemology, safety, necessary truth, reliabilism, virtue epistemology 
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In our latitudes many of us learned how to do philosophy in an analytical manner from Nenad 
Miščević. His implicit basic methodological advice was deceivingly simple: when 
investigating a certain philosophical problem you first do the “geography” of the field, map 
the main positions, develop a taxonomy, explore (inter)relations. And then – situate yourself, 
take a stand, argue for your option. A very simple advice, but difficult to follow. First of all, 
one usually lacks Nenad’s encyclopedic knowledge. Moreover, taking a firm stand is not 
always easy. Sometimes the problem addressed is complex, philosophy can really be difficult. 
This, I think, is true of the topic of my paper: the intersection of modal epistemology and 




A belief, even if true, cannot count as knowledge if it is just a matter of luck that the person so 
arrived at the truth. According to Pritchard (2007: 279–280) lucky events in general should be 
explained in the modal way:  An event is lucky only if it obtains in the actual world but does 
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not obtain in a wide class of near-by possible worlds in which the relevant initial conditions 
for that event are the same as in the actual world. Suppose you win in a fair lottery with 
astronomically long odds. There is a wide class of near-by possible worlds in which the 
relevant initial conditions for that event are the same as in the actual world, but you lose – due 
to a very small departure from the actuality, one ball (or whatever) turns differently. We start 
with a modal theory of luck, then delineate the sense in which knowledge is incompatible 
with luck and finally we formulate an anti-luck condition on knowledge in those terms 
(Pritchard 2007: 280): 
S’s true belief is lucky only if there is a wide class of near-by possible worlds in which 
S continues to believe the target proposition, and the relevant initial conditions for the 
formation of that belief are the same as in the actual world, and yet the belief is false. 
Consider the standard case of aposteriori epistemic luck adopted from Zagzebski (1996: 285–
6).   
Mary 
Mary has very good eyesight, but it is not perfect. She can reliably identify her 
husband sitting in his usual chair in the living room and she has made such an 
identification in many times. She enters the house, looks into the living room and 
forms the belief “My husband is sitting in the living room.” But she misidentified the 
man in the chair.  It is not her husband, but his brother, whom she had no reason to 
believe was even in the country. However, her husband was seated along the opposite 
wall of the living room, unseen by her.  
Mary forms a true belief by looking at the man in the chair. Her belief is justified (very good 
eyesight, etc.), but she does not know. Her belief is only luckily true, there is a wide class of 
near-by possible worlds in which she mistakenly continues to believe that her husband is in 
the living room (worlds without her husband in the room).  Knowledge is incompatible with 
luck, so if S knows that p, then S’s true belief that p could not have easily been false 
(Pritchard 2005: 156): 
For all agents, if an agent knows a contingent proposition p, then, in most near-by 
possible worlds in which she forms her belief about p in the same way as she forms 
her belief in the actual world, that agent only believes that p when p is true. 
This formulation of safety as anti-luck condition is not final but it will do for our purposes. 
True beliefs which could easily be false are lucky true beliefs and so unsafe. According to 
modal epistemology luck consists in the modal proximity of a false belief (if p had been false, 
you would still have believed it). This characterization immediately excludes the possibility of 
lucky beliefs in necessary truths: a belief in a true mathematical proposition could not easily 
be false because a proposition believed could never be false. Safety is incapable of 
eliminating epistemic luck in this case, for if p is necessarily true then S’s true belief that p is 
automatically safe.  
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Can we be lucky with respect to necessary or apriori truths? I will limit myself  to  simple 
mathematical truths in accordance with the bulk of the (scarce) literature on this topic.1 Let 
me start with several cases of simple luck. 
Felicity 
Felicity is learning how to solve fractions for two-figured numbers. She establishes the 
following result: 16/64 = 1/4. The method used is the following: cross out the last digit 
of the numerator and the first digit of the denominator (16/64). She forms some 
additional true beliefs based on this “heuristics”: 19/95 = 1/5 and 26/65 = 2/5. Her 
beliefs are true, but she does not really know that, say 26/65 = 2/5 (the method 
obviously fails in many other cases). 
Next take the famous Euler’s identity: ei + 1 = 0. Imagine the following scenario: 
 Mystica 
Mystica has learned about complex numbers in high school, she is also familiar with 
natural logarithms. In her dreams, later described by her as a moment of mystical 
revelation, she is struck by the mystical unity of five constants (e, i, , 1, 0) and three 
operations revealed to her in the form of: ei + 1 = 0. Her belief is true, but we would 
not say that she knows the Euler’s identity. 
Pritchard sometimes uses the example of a lucky guess – an agent forms a true belief in a 
mathematical proposition – that 2+2 = 4, by flipping a coin. More often he gives the example 
of a broken calculator (2012: 256): 
Mathema 
Mathema uses a calculator to find out the product of 12 × 13. As a result, he forms a 
true belief that 12 × 13 = 156. Unbeknownst to Mathema, however, his calculator is in 
fact broken and generating “answers” randomly. 
Mathema’s belief is luckily true, so he does not know the target proposition. These cases are 
the apriori counterparts to standard aposteriori cases of true beliefs based on hunches, 
superstition, horoscope, wishful thinking … . They are cases of simple luck, unjustified true 
beliefs. Are there any cases of justified true beliefs in necessary propositions which still fail to 
count as knowledge? Miščević introduces Jane, a good mathematician, who normally has 
reason to trust her capacities. But she makes two very subtle mistakes in calculation or proof 
that cancel each other out resulting in the correct solution (Miščević 2007: 56):  
Jane 
 
1 Levy (2011: 26) describes the case of Jack who is lucky with respect to his metaphysically necessary true belief 
that Water = H2O; Miščević also mentions some other cases in a footnote (Miščević 2007, fn. 25, 70-71). 
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Jane arrives at correct result R, which is further corroborated in application. In fact, it 
takes a genius to detect two subtle mistakes that have cancelled each other. Then, Jane 
is a priori justified in believing the result R. She thus has a true justified belief, which 
is, by most people’s lights, not a piece of knowledge. 
Jane is Gettier lucky in her apriori true belief (justified, but fails to know). Mary, Felicity, 
Mystica, Mathema and Jane are all cases of veritic luck: it is a matter of luck that the agent’s 
belief is true relative to her justification. They can be ordered from lucky guesses (simple 
luck) to Gettier-like double-luck scenarios (Mary, Jane). Can a unified modal theory of luck 
cover all of the cases and their combinations, apriori and aposteriori, simple luck and Gettier-




Modal theory of luck is a minimal change theory: an actual event is lucky only if it obtains in 
the actual world but does not obtain in a wide class of near-by possible worlds which are 
minimally different from the actual world. In the case of epistemic luck we are interested in 
the event of having a true belief. According to Miščević this event decomposes into two 
components: (1) the contribution of the world – the relevant facts of the matter; (2) the 
contribution of the agent. Furthermore there are three ways to explain the modal closeness of 
cognitive failure, of not having a true belief: (a) in a near-by world you have a false belief (p 
is not the case but you still believe it); (b) in a near-by world you do not have any beliefs 
whether p; (c) in a near-by world p is the case, but you believe that not-p. 
Recall Mary and her luckily true belief that her husband is sitting in the living room. Modal 
fragility of Mary’s actually true belief is explained by factors (1a) above: (1) the world might 
be slightly different (her husband is not in the living room), but (a) she would still believe that 
her husband is in the room. This explanation is “world-centered” according to Miščević 
(minimal changes in the world result in her having a false belief). Not so with Jane: the 
mathematical facts could not be different, so Miščević proposes (2b) or (2c) as explanandum 
of her lucky true belief (2007: 61): 
… had the cognizer’s ways of thinking (or even her capacities) been slightly different, 
she would not have managed to arrive at the same true belief as in the actual world. 
She might have ended up with believing the negation of the target proposition, or with 
agnosticism about it. 
If Jane had not made a second mistake that killed the first one she would have ended up with 
the wrong result. The locus of luck is the agent – “the unstable human mind with its limited 
capacities” and not the external environment. Instead of the safety principle, requiring the 
stability of a true belief under small changes in the environment (minimal differences in the 
world), we get the principle of agent stability (Miščević 2007: 61): 
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For all agents, A, if an agent knows an armchair proposition p, then, in most near-by 
possible worlds in which she forms her belief about p in a slightly different way or 
with slightly changed cognitive apparatus as in the actual world, that agent will also 
come to believe that p. 
There is, however, an immediate problem with this proposal. Remember our goal: a unified 
modal theory of luck covering all the cases and their combinations, apriori and aposteriori, 
simple luck and Gettier-luck. Yet the proposed solution does not cover the cases of simple 
luck at all! Felicity is quite stubborn, she uses a robust (albeit stupid) method of solving 
fractions for two-figured numbers. There is no instability in her cognitive functioning: when 
she believes truly she could not easily end up with the negation of the target proposition, or 
with agnosticism about it. The same is true of Mathema (he firmly believes the results of the 
broken computer) and Mystica (she is full of trust for her prophetic dreams and very stable in 
believing them). It is easy to spot the problem: they all use bad ways for forming their beliefs. 
And equally easy to find a remedy: do not use a way of forming your beliefs that could easily 
lead to false beliefs. Here is the famous grandmother case (Nozick 1981: 179): 
A grandmother sees her grandson is well when he comes to visit; but if he were sick or 
dead, others would tell her he was well to spare her upset. Yet this does not mean she 
doesn't know he is well (or at least ambulatory) when she sees him. 
If her grandson were sick she would still believe (falsely) he is well, yet she knows that he is 
well. In terms of safety – suppose that her grandson might (for whatever reason) easily be 
sick. The grandmother might then easily believe falsely that her grandson is well. Still, the 
fact that she would in a near-by possible world use another, deficient way of arriving at her 
mistaken belief (misleading testimony), does not show she didn't know that her grandson was 
well when she actually used the reliable way (sight).  
Once we focus on ways of forming beliefs it becomes clear that faulty methods must be the 
best explanation for lucky true beliefs in cases of Felicity, Mystica and Mathema. All of them 
use unreliable procedures, in near-by worlds they deliver false results. If Felicity used her 
method on 27/75 she would get the wrong result, if Mystica dreamt that e x i + 1 = 0 she 
would be wrong, if Mathema wanted to find out the product of 14 x 13 the broken calculator 
would give the wrong result. But note: “[the faulty] method by which [the belief is] reached 
could just as easily have led to a false belief in a different proposition” (Williamson 2000: 
182). And to quote Sainsbury (1995: 595): 
A lucky guess is not a proposition which might easily not have been true, but a way of 
reaching a belief which might easily not have delivered a true one. 
With respect to contingent propositions your faulty way of reaching a belief that p might 
easily deliver a false belief that p, but with respect to apriori true propositions your faulty way 
of reaching a belief that p might easily deliver a false belief in a different proposition, q.  
Let me introduce some standard scientific terminology (inspired by Luper 2012): a false 
positive is a test result that indicates a given condition has been fulfilled, when it actually has 
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not been fulfilled.  The main epistemological condition is truth, so a false positive is a case 
when your way of forming a belief indicates that a certain proposition is true while it is false. 
A false negative is a test result that indicates a given condition has not been fulfilled, when it 
actually was successful. In epistemology a false negative is a case when your way of forming 
a belief indicates that a certain proposition is not true while it really is true. We can know 
things even though the methods on which we rely might yield false negatives. It suffices that 
our methods would not give us false positives.  
Take an example from mathematics: (i) a number is divisible by 3 if the sum of the digits is 
divisible by 3; (ii) a number is divisible by 9 if the sum of the digits is divisible by 9. Suppose 
that Al mixed up something. He uses the second method for establishing that a number n is 
divisible by 3, but if the sum of the digits is not divisible by 9, then, he thinks, the number 
might or might not be divisible by 3. Using this method he establishes (and believes) that 
7227 is divisible by 3. Does he know that? Given his method he would be agnostic with 
respect to 7224. Still, he knows that 7227 is divisible by 3, his method will never yield a false 
positive (though it will miss some instances). Even more: suppose that Al uses the second 
method for establishing that number n is divisible by 3, but if the sum of the digits is not 
divisible by 9, then, he thinks, the number is not divisible by 3. Using this method he 
establishes that 7227 is divisible by 3. Does he know that? Given his method he would believe 
that 7224 is not divisible by 3. Still, he knows that 7227 is divisible by 3, his method will 
never yield a false positive (but it might give a false negative). 
Once we agree that safety must include the ways that epistemic agents use in forming their 
beliefs we get a uniform treatment of aposteriori luck and simple apriori luck. It is always the 
modal proximity of a false belief that matters (false positive), not the proximity of not having 
a true belief (false negative). We are interested in truth value of the belief that is formed in 
near-by possible worlds on the same basis as in the actual world, even when the resulting 
belief is not of the same proposition. We could codify a qualified safety condition along the 
lines suggested by Williamson (2009: 23): 
S’s true belief p is safe only if the basis B which resulted in S’s belief p is such that B 
could not easily result in a false belief that p or its epistemic counterparts.  
The counterpart p* is close to p in a way analogous to that in which a world w* may be close 
to a world w. Counterparts should be relativized to the agent: 27/75 = 2/5 is for Felicity a 
counterpart to 26/65 = 2/5, e x i + 1 = 0 is for Mystica a counterpart to ei + 1 = 0, and 14 x 
13 = 156 is for Mathema a counterpart to 12 × 13 = 156.  Luck undermines knowledge just 
when the conditions that gave rise to the belief could have easily yielded a falsehood. Any 
false belief formed in near-by possible worlds in the same way as in the actual world is 
relevant to the safety of the target belief, not just false beliefs in the very same proposition as 
in the actual world.  
How about Jane? Does she use a problematic method that luckily produces a true belief? After 
all her way of forming beliefs includes mistakes and a basis which includes mistakes could 
easily lead to a false belief in a different proposition. Consider, as an example, the history of 
Fermat’s Last Theorem: 
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The theorem is simple to state: The equation x-squared + y-squared = z-squared is true 
when the exponent is 2, or squared, but for no higher whole number. Fermat wrote a 
note in the margin of his Arithmetica by Diophantus (1630): "I have a truly marvellous 
demonstration of this proposition which this margin is too narrow to contain." 
Mathematicians have been trying to supply the missing proof for more than three and a 
half centuries. Finally Andrew Wiles on June 23th, 1993 proved a partial version of the 
Taniyama-Shimura-Weil Conjecture on elliptic curves, which had a very special 
corollary, namely Fermat's Last Theorem. Wiles checked and double-checked the 
proof before releasing it to the referees. The manuscript was split into seven chapters, 
and each chapter was sent to a pair of expert examiners. Gradually it emerged that 
there was a fundamental flaw in one stage of the argument. Stewart and Tall (2002: 
210) report Andre Weil’s comment on Wiles’ proof in the March 1994 issue of 
Scientific American: 
I believe he has had some good ideas in trying to construct the proof, but the 
proof is not there. To some extent, proving Fermat's Theorem is like climbing 
Everest. If a man wants to climb Everest and falls short of it by 100 yards, he 
has not climbed Everest. 
Many years earlier Wiles had considered using an alternative approach, but it 
floundered and so he had abandoned it. Now he realized that what was causing the 
more recent method to fail was exactly what would make the abandoned approach 
succeed. On October 6th, 1994 he sent the amended proof to three mathematicians 
primed for the job, and all three reviewers found the new ideas satisfactory. By the 
following year there was general agreement that the proof was acceptable. The proof 
was finally published in May 1995 (with 127 pages in total!). 
Did Wiles know in 1993? The theorem is true and he used a good (even genial) approach, 
there was just a “technical hitch” in the execution. Still, according to the experts cited above, 
strictly speaking, it was not a proof when it was announced.  
How much error does a justification in a mathematical proposition still tolerate? Proof based 
on mistakes is not accepted as a basis for forming mathematical beliefs. Given these high-
grade standards Jane forms her belief in a deficient way, so she does not know. She is like 
Felicity: what explains their failures to know are unsafe ways of forming their beliefs. 
Mistakes in the application of an algorithm count as an unreliable way of forming a belief. In 
a near-by world Jane forms a false belief (in a different proposition) on such a shaky basis, so 
we get the unified approach in the spirit of anti-luck epistemology (avoid the modal proximity 
of a false belief). 
The bar has now been set up very high. If near proof is not a proof, then a proposition based 
on such a proof is not justified. Even Jane’s actually true belief is then not justified. The case 
of Jane is not the case of Gettier-luck after all, it is just a sophisticated case of simple apriori 
luck. Let me call this “basis relativized small change theory of luck” (BSCT for short). The 
price for a unified modal theory of luck that BSCT has to pay seems to be an elimination of 
apriori true Gettier-lucky beliefs. 
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This solution squares with the consensus that apriori Gettier-lucky beliefs are at least 
possible. Let us explore another option, the one suggested by Miščević, I will call it “agent 
relativized small change theory” (ASCT for short). Jane is lucky (two mistakes cancel each 
other out), but she does not use any strange or problematic methods. Jane is like Mary, who 
misidentifies her husband in the living room, and not like Felicity. Mary’s belief is true and 
formed by her truth-conducive vision, it is just a matter of luck that her reliable procedure has 
resulted in true belief. In the same manner Jane’s cognitive success is not just a lucky guess, 
she uses a good procedure, it is just a matter of luck that the procedure has resulted in true 
belief. 
Let me explore Sosa’s analogy of an archer shooting at a target (Sosa 2007: 22). An accurate 
shot is successful in hitting the bull’s eye. An adroit shot manifests the archer’s competence. 
And an apt shot is accurate because it is adroit. The accuracy of an apt shot is creditable to the 
skill of the archer. In the same way we can ask whether a belief is accurate (true); whether a 
belief is adroit (epistemically competent) and finally, whether a belief is apt (true because 
competent). Apt beliefs are creditable to the skill of the believer and this dimension is absent 
in Gettier cases. Suppose that an archer’s competently shot arrow is first blown off course by 
a gust of wind. A second gust of wind then blows the arrow back onto its original course and 
the arrow hits the bull's eye. In this case the accuracy of the shot is not attributable to the 
archer’s skill, but rather to luck.  
Jane is a skillful mathematician, but the accuracy of her belief is not attributable to her skill.  
Mistakes which cancel each other are produced by the “winds of her mind,” so to speak. 
Mary's belief is true and formed by a reliable process (sight), but it is veritically lucky – small 
changes in the external environment could easily lead to her having a false belief. Jane’s 
belief is true and also formed by a reliable process (she follows the good algorithm, etc.) but it 
is a matter of luck that her procedure resulted in a true belief. Small changes in her "internal 
environment" (her attention, ability to avoid distractions, capacity to memorize, etc.) could 
easily lead to her having a false belief. According to ASCT the procedure she follows is 
reliable but the agent is not (due to “instability of her cognitive functioning"). 
Did we not say earlier that a near proof is no proof at all? Well, the verdict is not final. 
Remember how the case of Wiles was described (Stewart and Tall 2002: 210): “the reviewers 
found the new ideas satisfactory; by the following year there was general agreement that the 
proof was acceptable.” This would suggest less stringent criteria and dependency on social 
criteria: 
In the real world of mathematics, a mathematical paper does two things. It testifies that 
the author has convinced himself and his friends that certain »results« are true, and it 
presents a part of the evidence on which this conviction is based. Complete proof 
simply means proof in sufficient detail to convince the intended audience - a group of 
professionals with training and mode of thought comparable to that of the author 
(Davis, J. P., Hersh, R., 1987: 61). 
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Given these low-grade standards it is possible to describe both Wiles and Jane as having 
justified true beliefs after all. Her lack of knowledge would then really be explained by the 
modal proximity of the case where p is true but she fails to believe it or disbelieves it.  
We now have two general approaches, BSCT and ASCT – how to decide? Each has its merits 
and each has its problems. BSCT promises a unified modal theory of luck based on the critical 
question: how easy is it for a belief to be false, given the way it was formed? In case of 
necessary truths the target proposition need not be the same as the one actually believed. The 
main problem for BSCT is its elimination of Gettier-lucky apriori true beliefs. ASCT is 
motivated by the existence of Gettier-lucky apriori true beliefs from the very beginning. But 
the “winds of mind” solution is inappropriate in the cases of simply lucky apriori truths. 
Moreover, ASCT goes against the spirit of anti-luck epistemology: it is the modal proximity 




Let me sketch the most plausible directions of development for each theory and then “take my 
stand.” 
We saw that however the actual belief was produced, this is something we have to hold fixed 
when we go from the actual world to nearby worlds and assess whether the belief continues to 
be true. I spoke about methods, ways of forming a belief, basis for the belief … . Now we 
have to be more precise. Mary and (supposedly) Jane are justified because they both use 
generally reliable (truth-conducive) processes of forming their beliefs – process that produce 
mostly true beliefs: standard perceptual processes, remembering, good reasoning – correct 
algorithms, efficient heuristics, etc. Horoscopes, wishful thinking and the procedures used by 
Felicity, Mystica and Mathema are unreliable. Reliable processes are grounds for justification, 
unreliable processes explain cases of simple luck (their results could easily be false).  But 
when Nozick introduced methods of belief formation he did not have in mind such general 
belief-forming processes (1981: 184-85): 
A person can use a method (in my sense) without proceeding methodologically, and 
without knowledge or awareness of what method he is using. Usually, a method will 
have a final upshot in experience on which the belief is based, such as visual 
experience, and then (a) no method without this upshot is the same method, and (b) 
any method experientially the same, the same “from the inside”, will count as the same 
method. 
He was criticized for giving concessions to internalism and thus undermining his generally 
externalist epistemology. Still, Becker (2008) has argued persuasively that modal condition 
should be relativized to the actual method the agent uses in forming the specific (token) belief 
in question. When we distinguish the particular methods by which one forms a belief in a 
specific instance from the general processes from which one forms beliefs we see there are 
10 
 
two sources of luck according to Becker: world luck and process luck. True beliefs based on 
unreliable processes are cases of process luck. But Mary’s general belief-forming process 
(sight) is reliable, so there must be a different explanation for her luckily true particular belief 
– peculiar features of the actual world, this is the case of world luck (Becker 2008: 357). 
I think that these distinctions can be used by BSCT in order to explain our intuition that Jane’s 
belief is lucky, though justified. She uses a reliable process of belief formation (good 
algorithm), it’s just that her particular belief based on the specific method she actually uses is 
luckily true. Quirky features of the agent result in her having a reliably formed but still luckily 
true belief, so let’s call this a agent luck.  
We now have three types of luck: process luck, world luck and agent luck. Anti-luck 
conditions are usually sufficient to eliminate all cases of luck, but not always. Jane’s belief is 
safe, based on a reliable process which does not constitute knowledge because she is agent 
lucky. Her belief is based on a specific method (mistakes in the execution) which could easily 
lead to a false belief (in a different proposition).  Once we acknowledge these distinctions we 
recognize that it is not just beliefs apriori that can be safe but still agent lucky. The 
phenomenon is more general. Take the cases of memory in which I could easily be mistaken 
that p, but in fact I am not, and my true belief rests on evidence: 
Fish 
I believe we had fish for dinner on Saturday two weeks ago. This is true, we had 
flatfish. My grounds for holding this belief are memory and induction. We almost 
always have salmon on Saturdays and my memory is usually very reliable. But I 
completely forgot that my mother-in-law gave as two nice pieces of flatfish on 
Saturday morning, so we skipped salmon. 
It is compelling to say that my belief is justified, yet still luckily true. But this is not the case 
of world luck, it is not that the world could easily be different (no fish on Saturday). The 
source of luck are “winds of my mind,” mistakes in my memory which cancel each other out. 
And the explanation is the one offered by BSCT: my belief is agent-lucky because it is based 
on a specific method (holes in my memory) which might easily lead to a false belief in the 
target proposition. The target proposition is not the same as the one actually believed but its 
epistemic counterpart (say, when did I actually call the maintenance service, last Friday or last 
Thursday?). 
This is a promising way of developing BSCT though it is admittedly complex – there are now 
three types of luck (process, world, agent) and two components in the way of forming a belief 
(general process and specific method). So, let us explore the options for ASCT. The most 
natural development is in direction of virtue epistemology as suggested by Miščević (2007). 
Recall Mary – according to Zagzebski she forms a belief using her epistemic virtues 
(intellectual virtues, but we can include cognitive abilities and faculties) and her belief is true, 
but she does not have the truth because of her virtues (Zagzebski 1996: 297). Jane is like 
Mary: she has conscientiously attempted to reach the truth using sound mathematical methods 
and she does reach the truth. But she does not get to the truth through her conscientious 
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epistemic activity. She does not deserve credit for her success because one of the principal 
causes of her success is a lucky event (two mistakes cancelling each other out) and not her 
competence. Her success is not a manifestation of her ability.  
I have lumped several approaches in virtue epistemology together, since it is not clear how to 
augment the safety account with a virtue-theoretic conditions. With the resources of virtue 
epistemology, why still safety with all of its baggage (methods, ways of forming beliefs)? 
Why not virtues all the way down? There are proposals for a virtue-oriented theory of luck on 
the market: one’s belief is epistemically lucky when one fails to deserve credit for reaching 
the truth (Greco 2003). Or, whether an agent is lucky depends on whether the agent is in 
control of her action so one knows that p when one comes to have a true belief that p in a way 
that is sufficiently under one’s control (Riggs 2009). It seems that the approach of virtue 
epistemology will undermine the project that Miščević started with:  formulate an anti-luck 




Miščević draws our attention to the phenomenon of agent luck, an unexplored area in 
contemporary epistemology, an amazing achievement by-itself, given more than fifty years of 
“Gettierology.” Yet the evidential base for his approach is very thin. The case of lucky Jane 
belongs to a subclass (Gettier-lucky true beliefs) of a subclass (a priori lucky true beliefs) of a 
class (lucky true beliefs) and the proposed solution does not generalize. A uniform theory 
covering all cases of lucky knowledge might not be obtainable, there is a danger that we 
might end up agreeing with a defender of situationism: “I’m into situation epistemology. The 
situation changes, I change my epistemology.”   
Difficult choices and no neat solutions, but there is no reason for despair. I suggested a more 
traditional theory in the spirit of modal reliabilism. To compare, consider the following 
suggestion for a more general account in the direction of virtue epistemology (Miščević 2007: 
65): 
The modal definitions of luck in terms of surrounding worlds is world-centered, 
whereas the skeptical problem of the external world is mind-centered: it is the 
manipulability of our minds by the Demon and the poverty-underdetermination of the 
phenomenology that produce skeptical worries. So both external world luck and 
armchair luck have a common root and a definition of epistemic luck is needed that 
captures this common root having to do with qualities of “virtues” of the agent. 
When the agent does her epistemic best, when her beliefs are the product of her conscientious 
efforts and her best cognitive abilities, what more should be required from her to be virtuous? 
More checking and checking, developing better cognitive equipment (perhaps with the help of 
AI?)? Highly unrealistic demands, we are just not god-like – this is our epistemic human 
predicament. What more is needed? The world has to conspire in a beneficent way, or, better, 
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to combine Levin (2004: 407) with the insights from Miščević (2007): attaining the teloi of 
cognition is to some extent contingent on the world and the contingencies of our mind, and 
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